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Abstract: The gatekeeper position of app store operators gives them the power to favour their own 
and the most popular applications in the rankings of search results. Based on parallels with the 
non-discrimination principle in the European Union's Regulation on Open Internet Access, this 
article formulates a list of permitted and forbidden ranking rationales for app store operators. 
Permitted ranking rationales include text relevance, price, quality and the legality of content. These 
rationales contrast with the forbidden ranking rationales, such as those based on self-favouring 
without objective justification and the popularity of applications, which potentially limit consumer 




When consumers search for applications on their smartphones, they often start 
their discovery with entering queries into the search function of app stores. Based 
on those queries, the algorithms of app store operators generate sarch results, giv-
ing certain applications a more visible position than other applications. Consumers 
are more likely to select applications that have a top position in the rankings. Do-
gruel et al. (2015) show that the first five search results in app stores receive an 
estimated 87% of the traffic through search. This means that discriminatory rank-
ings of search results can limit consumer choice and the ability of app developers 
to compete within app stores. 
App stores serve as a gateway for connecting app developers and consumers. They 
turn from gateways into gatekeepers when they limit the ability of app developers 
to reach consumers (Bostoen, 2018, p. 11). The vertical integration of app stores 
gives them the economic incentive to give their own applications a competitive 
advantage in the rankings of search results (Krämer & Schnurr, 2018, p. 523). Nicas 
and Collins (2019) report that Apple has favoured its own applications over those 
of competitors in the rankings in the App Store. Others argue that rankings based 
on popularity favour large and established players, placing small and new busi-
nesses on a lower competitive footing (Pandey et al., 2005, p. 1). 
Due to high legal standards, EU competition law currently does not allow the Eu-
ropean Commission to intervene effectively against discriminatory rankings in app 
stores. To complement EU competition law, the EU legislator adopted the Plat-
form-to-Business Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, P2B Regulation) in June 
2019. The P2B Regulation contains various transparency obligations for the rank-
ings of search results in app stores. However, the P2B Regulation does not contain 
a prohibition of discrimination between app developers in those rankings. 
Referring to the gatekeeper position of platforms, some scholars argue in favour of 
a non-discrimination principle for the rankings of search results (Pasquale, 2008, 
pp. 266-267). Bostoen (2018) draws parallels with EU telecom regulation, includ-
ing net neutrality. On 30 April 2016, the Open Internet Access Regulation (Regula-
tion (EU) 2015/2120, OI Regulation) entered into force. The Regulation introduces 
an obligation for providers of internet access services (ISPs) to treat traffic within 
their networks without discrimination. The EU legislator justifies this ex ante non-
discrimination principle based on the gatekeeper position of ISPs. The OI Regula-
tion seeks to prevent discriminatory practices of ISPs that reduce the incentives for 
online businesses to compete and innovate within the internet ecosystem. 
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Based on parallels with the non-discrimination principle in the OI Regulation, this 
article proposes a new ex ante EU-wide regulatory regime that prohibits app store 
operators to treat applications differently in the rankings of search results without 
objective justification. The article arrives at a (non-exhaustive) list of forbidden 
and permitted ranking rationales and variables for app stores. Ranking rationales 
refer to the economic or legal logic of app store operators for engaging in specific 
ranking practices. Permitted ranking rationales are formulated, such as those 
based on quality and price, which reflect consumer choice and the parameters of 
effective competition between app developers in a market economy. Ranking ratio-
nales, which potentially limit consumer choice and distort the digital level playing 
field, include self-favouring without objective justification and the popularity of 
applications. The proposed framework could serve as a source of inspiration for a 
prohibition of discriminatory rankings under the new Digital Markets Act. 
This article is structured as follows. Firstly, the article describes how Apple ranks 
search results within the App Store (section 1). Apple's ranking practices are used 
as a case study in this article. Secondly, the article explores the need for new ex 
ante sector-specific regulation of discriminatory rankings in app stores, comple-
menting EU competition law (section 2). Based on theoretical and empirical litera-
ture, this article identifies several shortcomings of the enforcement of EU competi-
tion law against discriminatory rankings in app stores. The article also shows that 
the P2B Regulation does not contain a prohibition of such discriminatory practices. 
Supported by doctrinal legal research, this article derives a new framework from 
the OI Regulation for the regulation of rankings in app stores (section 3). The pro-
posed non-discrimination principle is then applied to the case of Apple's rankings 
within the App Store (section 4). Finally, some of the counter-arguments, as identi-
fied in the literature on the regulation of online search, are rebutted (section 5). 
Section 1: Apple's ranking practices in the App Store 
Introduction 
In 2008, Apple launched the App Store and enabled app developers to produce 
apps for its operating system, iOS (ACM, 2019, p. 20). App store operators are ac-
tive in two-sided markets, which are subject to indirect network effects (Evans, 
2003, p. 192). Indirect network effects mean that Apple's platform is more attrac-
tive to consumers when there is a range and diversity of popular applications 
available in its App Store. In order to convince app developers to launch their ap-
plications in the App Store, Apple must attract a sufficiently large consumer base. 
An important way for app store operators to attract consumers is to make it easier 
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for consumers to find their preferred applications through the search function in 
the app store. Data from Sensor Tower shows that the majority of app downloads in 
the App Store originates from search (Briskman, 2018). 
The ranking of apps within the App Store 
When consumers want to find an application on their iPhone, they can enter 
queries into the search function of the App Store. Based on about 42 variables, Ap-
ple's algorithms rank the applications for a given search query and provide search 
results to the consumer (Nicas & Collins, 2019). Although Apple's algorithms are 
largely a “black box”, Apple has published the following rationales and variables 
for the ranking of organic search results: 
• The first ranking rationale is the text relevance for a given search query 
entered by the consumer. This ranking rationale includes ranking variables 
such as the name of the application, keyword field and the selected 
primary category of the application (Apple, 2020). 
• The second ranking rationale concerns the quality of the applications. This 
rationale covers variables such as the average rating of consumers and the 
quality of reviews (Apple, 2020). 
• The third ranking rationale is the popularity of applications. This ranking 
rationale covers variables such as the amount of downloads and the 
number of ratings and reviews (Apple, 2020). The use of these variables 
may favour large and established over small and new app developers in 
downstream markets. The reason is that popularity often correlates with 
market positions of firms (Pandey et al., 2005, p. 1). 
• The fourth ranking rationale is the personalisation of search results in the 
App Store. This rationale consists of variables such as the search and 
purchase history of consumers (Apple, 2020). 
Potentially discriminatory ranking practices 
Reportedly, Apple has systematically favoured its own applications in the rankings 
of the App Store. Based on 600 searches on six iPhone models in the US, Mickle 
(2019) found that Apple's applications are ranked first in 95% of searches for appli-
cations that generate revenue through subscriptions or sales. Nicas and Collins 
(2019) report that Spotify used to be ranked first in the App Store for the search 
term “music” in the United States. However, the launch in June 2016 of Apple's own 
music-streaming service, Apple Music, caused a drop in the rankings for Spotify. 
Apple Music has appeared first in the rankings in the category “music” since its in-
troduction (Nicas & Collins, 2019). 
Apple has acknowledged that it does not apply consumer ratings and reviews to its 
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own pre-installed applications, while these variables do affect the rankings of 
competitors' applications (Mickle, 2019, p. 6). However, Apple has stated that it 
does not favour its own applications over others in the rankings of its search re-
sults. Apple claims that the high rankings of its own applications are based on 
“user behaviour data” and can be explained by the “strong connection” of con-
sumers with Apple's services (Mickle, 2019, p. 1). 
Apple's self-favouring ranking practices and the use of the popularity ranking ra-
tionale raise concerns. When online businesses expect that a platform will discrim-
inate against them, they are less likely to compete and innovate (Khan, 2018, p. 
1008). EU competition law currently does not deal effectively with discriminatory 
ranking practices in app stores (section 2). At the same time, the P2B Regulation 
does not contain ex ante rules that prohibit discriminatory rankings in app stores 
(section 2). 
On 15 December 2020, the European Commission published a proposal for a new 
Digital Markets Act (DMA). The proposed DMA bans self-favouring ranking prac-
tices by app stores that will be designated as “gatekeepers” under the DMA (sec-
tion 3). It remains to be seen whether the proposed prohibition will also be includ-
ed in the final text of the DMA, which requires that the prohibition is accepted by 
the European Parliament and the Council in the legislative procedure. 
Section 2: The need for new ex ante sector-specific 
regulation complementing EU competition law 
Limitations of EU competition law 
The European Commission and the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Mar-
kets (ACM) have announced competition law investigations into several practices 
of Apple surrounding its App Store. Yet, these authorities do not seem to focus 
their investigations on discriminatory rankings in Apple's App Store. 
Geradin and Katsifis (2020) argue that Apple's self-favouring ranking practices 
(section 1) could potentially be qualified as an abuse of dominance under EU com-
petition law. Nevertheless, for several reasons, this article argues that EU competi-
tion law provides the European Commission with limited means to intervene effec-
tively ex post against discriminatory rankings in app stores. Firstly, the substantive 
legal standards for intervening against self-favouring ranking practices are un-
clear. The Google Search (Shopping) decision from the European Commission shows 
that self-favouring ranking practices of dominant platforms can constitute an ex-
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clusionary abuse under EU competition law (European Commission, 2017, para 
341). However, the decision leaves legal uncertainty as to what substantive legal 
standards determine whether a specific differential ranking practice amounts to 
abusive self-favouring (Zingales, 2019, pp. 407-408). 
Secondly, the substantive legal standards for intervention are presumably too high 
in cases where the use of the popularity ranking rationale systematically favours 
large over small app developers in app stores. One important reason is that EU 
competition law aims to protect effective competition, but does not seek to safe-
guard a level playing field for all firms (Graef, 2019, p. 480). For example, if a new 
app developer is not (yet) as efficient as the dominant app store operator in the 
downstream market, EU competition law generally provides little protection to this 
app developer. 
Thirdly, the long average duration of EU competition law cases undermines the 
ability of the European Commission to prevent restrictions of competition in down-
stream markets by dominant platforms (Van Gorp & De Bijl, p. 201). Cases regard-
ing abuse of dominant position have an estimated average duration of 61 months 
(Dethmers & Blondeel, 2017, p. 161). This is due to the laborious work of defining 
the relevant market, evaluating dominance and establishing a theory of harm, 
which is especially complicated in digital markets. Posner (2000) argues that 
lengthy procedures are particularly problematic in digital markets where condi-
tions change rapidly. 
Some scholars, such as Lundqvist (2019), have argued that the EU legislator should 
not turn to ex ante sector-specific regulation, but should wait for EU competition 
law to develop new tests and tools. There are various initiatives to improve the ef-
fectiveness of the enforcement of EU competition law against discriminatory prac-
tices of “digital gatekeepers” (Furman, 2019, p. 41). The European Commission cur-
rently explores the need for a new competition tool to ensure “timely and effective 
intervention against structural competition problems across markets”, which in-
cludes competition problems related to digital gatekeepers (European Commis-
sion, 2020, p. 1). Scholars have also proposed several legal shortcuts to enable 
speedier interventions against platforms that act as digital gatekeepers. For exam-
ple, Van Gorp and De Bijl (2019) propose a policy option where a discriminatory 
practice of a vertically integrated platform gives rise to a legal presumption of an 
abuse of dominance (Van Gorp & De Bijl, 2019, pp. 43-44). 
Although these initiatives and proposals seem promising, some scholars have 
rightly pointed out that it is currently unclear when a platform should be consid-
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ered a “digital gatekeeper” under EU competition law (Graef, 2018, p. 486). The Eu-
ropean Commission and European courts have not yet defined and applied this 
concept in EU competition law cases (Alexiadis & De Streel, 2020, pp. 5-6). The 
shortcomings of EU competition law, as mentioned in this section, therefore also 
justify the exploration of complementary ex ante regulation by the EU legislator. 
The proposal for the DMA acknowledges that EU competition law provides limited 
means to intervene timely and effectively against a number of harmful practices of 
digital gatekeepers (Proposal DMA, consideration 5). The DMA seeks to comple-
ment EU competition law and includes, inter alia, an ex ante prohibition of self-
favouring rankings of app stores that are designated as “gatekeeper” under the 
DMA (section 3). In contrast to EU competition law, the proposal for the DMA sets 
out a framework for determining whether a specific platform must be considered a 
digital gatekeeper (Proposal DMA, Article 3). 
The Platform-to-Business Regulation 
To complement EU competition law, the EU legislator adopted the P2B Regulation 
in June 2019. The Regulation contains ex ante rules to improve fairness, trans-
parency and effective redress possibilities in the commercial relationship between 
providers of online intermediary services (platforms) and businesses that provide 
their services through these platforms (online businesses). The Regulation men-
tions that platforms “serve as a gateway to consumers” and are “crucial for the 
commercial success of undertakings who use such services to reach consumers” 
(Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, considerations 2 and 12). The P2B Regulation seeks 
to promote fairness and transparency in this relationship of economic dependency 
between platforms and online businesses, with the aim of enhancing trust in the 
platform economy (Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, considerations 2 and 3). 
To achieve its goals, the P2B Regulation introduces, inter alia, various transparency 
requirements for the rankings of platforms such as app stores. The transparency 
obligations in the P2B Regulation seek to balance between 1) the interest of on-
line businesses to get an adequate understanding of the functioning of the algo-
rithms, and 2) the interest of app stores to prevent imitation and “gaming” of the 
algorithms (Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, consideration 27). 
The first transparency obligation means that app stores must be transparent about 
the main ranking variables and changes in those variables. Article 5(1) of the Regula-
tion imposes the obligation on app stores to describe in their terms and conditions 
1) the number and type of main variables used to rank services on their platform 
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and 2) the reasons of the relative importance of those variables as compared to 
other variables. Furthermore, app stores are required to notify online businesses 
about changes in the main ranking variables in their terms and conditions (Regula-
tion (EU) 2019/1150, Article 3(2) in conjunction with Article 5(1)). Article 3(2) of 
the P2B Regulation states that the notification must generally be provided at least 
15 days before applying the changes in the main variables. The main ranking vari-
ables are to be selected by the app stores themselves (European Commission, 
2020, paras 39-42), which may cover those currently published by Apple (section 
1). 
The second transparency obligation entails that app stores should provide trans-
parency regarding decisions to lower the rankings of applications. Article 4(1) of the 
P2B Regulation states that app stores must provide a “statement of reasons” when 
they decide to demote the rankings of a specific application (Regulation (EU) 2019/
1150, consideration 22). The statement must enable the app developer to chal-
lenge the demotion in rankings within the internal complaint-handling process of 
the app store (Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, consideration 22). Furthermore, under 
Article 12 of the Regulation, a large app store and app developer also have the 
possibility to solve a dispute concerning the demotion in rankings through media-
tion. If the app developer successfully challenges the decision to lower its rank-
ings, Article 4(3) of the Regulation obliges the app store to correct the demotion 
“without undue delay”. However, the P2B Regulation does not contain any rules as 
to when a demotion in rankings would be unjustified. 
Article 7(1) of the P2B Regulation contains the third transparency obligation, 
which entails that app stores should be transparent about the differential treatment 
between own applications and those of competitors. Article 7(3) mentions that such 
differential treatment includes the favouring of own applications in the rankings 
of search results. Article 7(1) states that the app store must be transparent about 
the “main economic, commercial or legal considerations for such preferential treat-
ment”. 
The P2B Regulation does not contain an ex ante prohibition of discrimination in 
the rankings of search results in app stores. The European Commission has stated 
that a “fully binding solution (…) prohibiting the trading practices in question (…)” 
is not adopted because it was considered “disproportionate” (European Commis-
sion, 2018, p. 2). One reason for this could be that most obligations in the P2B 
Regulation apply to all online platforms, regardless of their size. This article pro-
poses an ex ante prohibition of discriminatory rankings that would only apply to 
app stores that act as digital gatekeepers. The non-discrimination principle for 
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rankings in app stores, as proposed in this article, can be used as a source of inspi-
ration for a prohibition of discriminatory rankings under the DMA. 
Section 3: The parallels with the Open Internet Access 
Regulation 
Justifications for deriving inspiration from the Open Internet 
Access Regulation 
As stated above, the European Commission has published a proposal for a new 
Digital Markets Act (DMA) on 15 December 2020. The goal of the DMA is to ensure 
the contestability and fairness of digital markets (Proposal DMA, Article 1(1)). Arti-
cle 6(1), under d, of the proposed DMA lays down a prohibition for digital plat-
forms, designated as gatekeepers, to “refrain from treating more favourably in 
ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself (...) compared to 
similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory 
conditions to such ranking”. The aim behind this proposed prohibition is to prevent 
digital gatekeepers from undermining the contestability for services (e.g. music 
streaming services) offered through their platforms (Proposal DMA, consideration 
48). The European Commission has mentioned in earlier documents that ex ante 
regulation in the telecom sector can be a useful source of inspiration for the new 
legal framework in the DMA (European Commission, 2020, p. 4). Based on parallels 
with EU telecom legislation, this article provides proposals for the way that the EU 
legislator can shape a prohibition of discriminatory rankings in the DMA. It also 
shows how the European Commission can apply this prohibition to app stores 
when implementing and enforcing the DMA in the future. 
Drawing parallels with the OI Regulation, this article proposes new ex ante EU reg-
ulation that forbids app store operators to differentiate in the rankings of search 
results without objective justification. The motivation for drawing parallels with 
the OI Regulation is twofold. Firstly, both ISPs and app store operators are gate-
keepers of the internet. This gives these companies the power to discriminate 
against competitors, which reduces the incentives of competitors to compete and 
innovate. Secondly, the OI Regulation contains a non-discrimination principle, 
which provides a useful source of inspiration for the regulation of rankings in app 
stores. Based on parallels with the OI Regulation, the EU legislator is able to pro-
vide flexibility to app store operators to engage in ranking practices that reduce 
search costs for consumers, while prohibiting those practices that limit consumer 
choice and distort the level playing field. 
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The article acknowledges that app store operators and ISPs differ in various ways 
from each other. These companies offer different types of services and operate in 
different markets. For example, a number of ISPs used to be public companies, 
which were privatised in the EU from the 1980s onwards (Savin, 2018, p. 13). App 
store operators do not share this history with ISPs. Possibly, app store markets are 
also more dynamic in terms of innovation than the markets in which ISPs operate. 
Despite these differences, drawing parallels with the OI Regulation enables the EU 
legislator to formulate clearly defined prohibitions of specific discriminatory rank-
ing practices in app stores. The OI Regulation sets out two legal frameworks to as-
sess if the use by ISPs of a specific rationale for differential treatment of traffic vio-
lates the non-discrimination principle. These legal frameworks can be used to for-
mulate specific permitted and forbidden ranking rationales for app stores (section 
4). 
The gatekeeper position of ISPs and app store operators 
Providers of internet access services 
ISPs can be considered gateways for connecting online businesses and consumers. 
Two conditions can be formulated for the gateway position of ISPs. Firstly, the in-
ternet access services that ISPs provide are crucial for online businesses to reach 
consumers. Secondly, consumers have few alternatives to access the applications 
of online businesses next to their internet access service. 
For a specific group of online businesses, such as music and video streaming ser-
vices, internet connectivity is indispensable for reaching consumers with their ap-
plications. It is crucial for this group of firms that an ISP provides them with an in-
ternet access service that meets the quality of service requirements of their appli-
cations. If an ISP blocks or throttles the traffic of these applications, this affects 
the quality of experience of the consumer (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). It 
makes the service less attractive to consumers, potentially leading to a decrease in 
consumers and a loss of revenues for the online business. 
Consumers also have few alternatives besides the internet access service of their 
current ISP to access the applications of their choice. Due to high economic and le-
gal barriers to entry in telecom markets (Hauge & Jamison, 2009, pp. 23-25), a lim-
ited number of ISPs is active in the national telecom markets of EU member states 
(Lear et al., 2017, pp. 40 and 53). Another factor that makes consumers dependent 
on their ISP, are the relatively high costs of switching between ISPs (Hauge & 
Jamison, 2009, p. 25). Data for the Netherlands shows that only 11% of the Dutch 
consumers of mobile subscriptions switched between mobile providers in a period 
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of 12 months in 2019-2020 (ACM, 2020, p. 18). 
ISPs are thus gateways for connecting a specific group of online businesses and 
consumers. The OI Regulation seeks to prevent ISPs from turning into gatekeepers 
that pick winners and losers on the internet (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). 
The vertical integration of ISPs gives the economic incentive to treat the traffic of 
their own applications more favourably than the traffic of competitors. With the 
adoption of the OI Regulation, the EU legislator responded to the frequently re-
ported discriminatory practices of ISPs to block or throttle the traffic of Voice over 
IP services and peer-to-peer services (BEREC, 2012, p. 8). 
App stores 
App stores can also be regarded as a gateway for connecting online businesses 
and consumers. Firstly, app stores provide a service crucial for app developers to 
reach consumers. Secondly, consumers have few alternatives for accessing the ap-
plications of app developers next to app stores. This section will illustrate this 
based on the case study of Apple's App Store. 
For app developers, Apple's App Store is crucial to reach iPhone users. Hyrynsalmi 
et al. (2016) show that multi-homing by app developers between app stores is rel-
atively uncommon.For the App Store, 2.6 to 4.9% of the applications are offered in 
one or more other app stores (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2016, p. 122). Even if an app de-
veloper is multi-homing between different app stores, it is still crucial for an app 
developer to be present in the App Store. The decision to withdraw from the App 
Store would make it difficult for the app developer to serve iPhone users, which 
will likely result in a loss of consumers and revenues (Geradin & Katsifis, 2020, p. 
32). Within Apple's ecosystem, app developers have few alternative channels to 
reach iPhone users (ACM, 2019, pp. 43-46). For example, another option for app 
developers could be to offer content via web-apps. However, apps provided 
through the App Store give better access to the hardware functionalities of an 
iPhone (e.g., the camera or GPS), while web-apps do not offer the possibility of 
“swiping” (ACM, 2019, p. 43). 
Consumers that use the iPhone also have few alternatives besides Apple's App 
Store to access the applications of their choice. Most consumers use one smart-
phone (Höppner et al., 2013, p. 6). Due to the high barriers to enter these markets, 
consumers have few options when choosing their preferred operating system (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2018). When consumers use an iPhone, Apple's App Store is 
the only app store available on iOS (ACM, 2019, p. 21). ACM (2019) shows that con-
sumers have few alternatives to the App Store for accessing apps on their iPhone, 
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except some limited possibilities for “tech-savvy” consumers (e.g. “jailbreaking”). 
The costs for consumers to switch between operating systems is high because of, 
inter alia, the effort to learn how to use another operating system (European Com-
mission, 2018, para 527). As a result, consumers may become “locked-in” with Ap-
ple's ecosystem beyond the life cycle of their iPhone (ACM, 2019, p. 55). For exam-
ple, in the Netherlands, only 9% of the consumers who bought another smart-
phone in 2018 voluntarily switched between operating systems (ACM, 2019, p. 53). 
App store operators turn from gateways into gatekeepers when their rankings of 
search results limit the ability of app developers to reach consumers. As indicated 
in the introduction, Dogruel et al. (2015) show that the first five search results in 
app stores receive an estimated 87% of the traffic through search. 1 At the same 
time, Apple increasingly plays the “dual role” of a platform operator and a market 
participant in downstream markets (Khan, 2019, pp. 983-984). This vertical inte-
gration gives Apple the economic incentive to favour its own downstream applica-
tions over those of competitors. Apple's self-favouring ranking practices (section 1) 
provides an example where an app store operator turns into a gatekeeper. Another 
example is when the use of the popularity ranking rationale results in a systematic 
advantage for large app developers (section 1). 
The non-discrimination principle in the Open Internet Access 
Regulation 
In Telenor Hungary (2020), Advocate General Sánchez-Bordona considered the pro-
tection of an open internet as the primary aim of the OI Regulation. The internet is 
considered open when it is an “open platform for innovation with low access barri-
ers for end-users” (OI Regulation, consideration 3). To achieve this aim, the OI Reg-
ulation lays down a non-discrimination principle for the treatment of traffic by 
ISPs. This allows ISPs to differentiate between traffic within their networks, as long 
as the consumers´ freedom to access the applications of their choice (i.e., con-
sumer choice) is not limited and the level playing field is not distorted. This con-
trasts with a strict neutrality principle, which would require the equal treatment of 
traffic by ISPs. The EU legislator seeks to give room to ISPs to handle traffic effi-
ciently and provide innovative connectivity services, while safeguarding an open 
internet (ACM, 2018, p. 10). 
1. The estimate of 87% is based on observations of 49 smartphone users from the United States and 
Germany viewing 189 apps in the Google Play Store from three predetermined categories of apps 
on a laboratory smartphone. In personal correspondence, the authors mentioned they “do not ex-
pect any different findings” were they to replicate the study (L. Dogruel et al., personal communica-
tion, 13 October 2020). 
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Similarly, the proposed non-discrimination principle for rankings of search results 
within app stores aims to find a balance between 1) giving app store operators the 
flexibility to engage in ranking practices that reduce search costs for consumers, 
and 2) prohibiting those practices that limit consumer choice and distort the level 
playing field (section 4). 
The two legal frameworks in the Open Internet Access Regulation 
The OI Regulation sets out two legal frameworks for assessing if ISP practices vio-
late the non-discrimination principle. In Telenor Hungary (2020), Advocate General 
Sánchez-Bordona stated that both frameworks aim to protect the right of end 
users to open internet access, as laid down in Article 3(1) of the Regulation. This 
right consists of 1) the right for consumers and business users of internet access 
services to access the applications of their choice and 2) the right for content and 
application providers (online businesses) to provide their applications via the in-
ternet access service. The first element seeks to protect consumer choice, while the 
second element seeks to safeguard a level playing field on the internet. It aims to 
ensure that small and new players, such as digital start-ups, can compete on an 
equal footing with big and established players (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). 
The first legal framework applies to agreements and commercial practices of ISPs. 
The second legal framework deals with technical measures of ISPs to differentiate 
between traffic within the network. Central to both frameworks are the potential 
and actual effects of a practice on the open internet. In Telenor Hungary (2020), the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the first framework requires authorities to as-
sess the effects of the practice on the rights of end-users as laid down in Article 
3(1), while the second framework does not. 
Agreements and commercial practices 
Article 3(2) of the OI Regulation sets out a legal framework for practices relating 
to the commercial relationship between ISPs and end users. This category includes 
1) agreements between ISPs and end-users on commercial and technical condi-
tions of internet access services, and 2) any commercial practices of ISPs. One spe-
cific example of a commercial practice is “zero-rating”. Zero-rating refers to a prac-
tice where the ISP does not count the use of certain applications towards the 
monthly maximum data that consumers can use for mobile internet (Krämer & 
Peitz, 2018, p. 502). 
Article 3(2) states that these agreements and commercial practices are allowed, as 
long as these do not limit the exercise of the end users' right to open internet ac-
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cess as laid down in Article 3(1). A zero-rating service violates the non-discrimina-
tion principle when it limits consumer choice and distorts the digital level playing 
field. Based on multiple factors, national regulatory authorities must assess this on 
a case-by-case basis (BEREC, 2020, paras 42-48). In particular, the authorities 
should evaluate whether the zero-rating is open to all applications within a cer-
tain category (e.g. music streaming). They must assess the barriers to enter the ze-
ro-rating scheme and the number of small businesses that have entered the zero-
rating (Krämer & Peitz, 2018, p. 508). In other words, the zero-rating scheme may 
not be based on the rationale of favouring the large and popular over small and new 
businesses. 
Technical treatment of traffic 
Article 3(3) of the OI Regulation contains a legal framework for the technically dif-
ferential treatment of traffic within the networks of ISPs. These practices vary from 
giving temporary priority to certain traffic (e.g. VoIP) over other traffic (e.g. e-mail) 
in a situation of network congestion, to the practice of throttling or blocking traffic 
of specific applications. The European Court of Justice ruled in Telenor Hungary
(2020) that national regulatory authorities can assess these technical measures—in 
parallel—under Article 3(2) and 3(1), to the extent that these measures are includ-
ed as technical conditions in the agreements with end users. 
Article 3(3) contains the general rule that ISPs must treat all traffic equally and 
without discrimination in technical terms. Under Article 3(3), second paragraph, 
ISPs are allowed to take reasonable traffic management measures. This provision 
allows technical differentiation between traffic by ISPs to efficiently handle traffic 
and prevent congestion in the network. To be considered reasonable, traffic man-
agement measures must meet several cumulative requirements. One of these re-
quirements is that the rationale for these measures should be based on objectively 
technical requirements of traffic, and may not be based on commercial considera-
tions. This ban covers the prioritisation of traffic from the ISP's own applications 
without objective technical justification. In other words, the OI Regulation categor-
ically bans prioritisation of traffic based on the rationale of self-favouring without 
objective justification. 
Section 4: Application of the framework to Apple's 
ranking practices 
The non-discrimination principle in the OI Regulation can be used as a source of 
inspiration for the regulation of discriminatory rankings in app stores. Based on 
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the case study of Apple's App Store, a list of permitted and forbidden ranking ratio-
nales is developed. The article formulates several permitted ranking rationales 
that do not limit consumer choice or distort the level playing field. The article pro-
poses a categorical ban of self-favouring ranking rationales without objective jus-
tification and an effects-based prohibition of the popularity ranking rationale. A 
public authority in the EU could monitor and enforce the proposed regulatory 
framework. The article leaves open whether this should be a new or existing pub-
lic authority. 
Permitted ranking rationales 
It is the very business of app store operators to rank applications when consumers 
search for their preferred application. However, Chandler (2007) rightly argues that 
online businesses should not be subject to discriminatory ranking rationales that 
the consumer would not use. When app store operators use ranking rationales 
based on text relevance, quality and personalisation (section 1), this merely reflects 
consumer choice and the parameters of effective competition in a market economy. 
The same reasoning applies to rationales related to the price and legality of con-
tent. The use of these ranking rationales reduces search costs for consumers, 
which is welfare-enhancing (Martens, 2016, p. 20). Under the proposed non-dis-
crimination principle, these would constitute permitted ranking rationales. 
Consumers may have different notions of the quality of applications and the desir-
ability of personalisation of search results. The EU legislator could facilitate con-
sumer choice by requiring app stores to implement a functionality enabling con-
sumers to opt-in and opt-out of ranking variables relating to quality and personali-
sation. 
Forbidden ranking rationales 
This section discusses the proposed framework for self-favouring ranking ratio-
nales without objective justification, the popularity ranking rationale, and a cir-
cumvention by app store operators of the forbidden ranking rationales. 
Unequal application of ranking variables 
Apple has stated that it does not apply consumer ratings and reviews to its own 
pre-installed applications, while these variables do affect the rankings of competi-
tors' applications (section 1). An Apple spokesperson argued that “pre-installed 
apps don't need to be rated because they're already integrated into the iPhone” 
(Mickle, 2019, p. 6). Based on this information, Apple's justification for the unequal 
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application of ranking variables does not follow from one of the formulated per-
mitted ranking rationales such as quality or price. 
If Apple cannot provide an objective justification for excluding its own applications 
from the application of certain ranking variables, then it should be regarded as the 
forbidden ranking rationale of self-favouring without objective justification. The 
higher position of Apple's own applications would then not be based on the merits 
of its applications, but would give Apple an artificial competitive advantage. The 
use of such a ranking rationale would violate the proposed non-discrimination 
principle, as it would unjustifiably steer consumers and distort the level playing 
field in favour of Apple's own applications. 
Variables favouring own applications 
Apple has reportedly engaged in ranking practices where it favoured its own appli-
cations (e.g. Apple Music) over those of competitors (e.g. Spotify). As Apple's algo-
rithms are largely a “black box”, there is not much public information available 
about their exact functioning (section 1). This article discusses various scenarios 
that have been reported in the context of other markets (i.e. airlines and e-com-
merce platforms). This section shows how the proposed non-discrimination princi-
ple would deal with each of the scenarios. 
The first scenario is that Apple favours its own applications in the App Store's 
rankings based on permitted ranking rationales such as quality. In this scenario, 
Apple is able to provide an objective justification for its ranking practices. The 
ranking practice would be allowed under the proposed non-discrimination princi-
ple. 
The second scenario is that its own applications are ranked more favourably than 
those of competitors based on variables relating to Apple’s own identity. In the 
past, airlines in the United States applied variables relating to their own identity in 
their Customer Reservation System (CRS). When travel agents searched for flights 
through CRS, the airlines' own flights were often ranked first, even though other 
companies offered lower prices or better service (Edelman, 2011, p. 27). Eventually, 
the United States Department of Justice intervened and introduced rules prohibit-
ing variables relating to the airlines' own identity (Edelman, 2011, p. 27). 
A third scenario is that Apple uses ranking variables relating to the profitability for 
its own business. Mattioli (2019) reports that Amazon had plans to add “proxies for 
profit” to its search algorithms used on the market platform. These proxies are 
variables that correlate with the profitability of rankings for Amazon's own busi-
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ness, which might not be observable for consumers and online businesses (Matti-
oli, 2019, p. 6). 
These last two scenarios would mean that Apple would use ranking variables re-
lating to its own identity or profitability, which fall under the forbidden ranking ra-
tionale of self-favouring without objective justification. The use of such variables 
would give an artificial competitive advantage to Apple in the rankings of search 
results, which is not based on the merits of the applications. It would unjustifiably 
steer consumers and distort the level playing field in favour of Apple's own appli-
cations over those of competitors. Therefore, it would constitute an infringement 
of the proposed non-discrimination principle. 
Popularity ranking rationale 
App developers operate in “winner-takes-most” markets, where 3% of the app de-
velopers get more than 80% of app downloads (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2016, p. 125). 
Apple uses the popularity ranking rationale, such as a variable for the number of 
downloads. The use of such variables may favour large and established over small 
and new businesses in downstream markets (section 1). 
The use of a popularity ranking rationale leads to a self-enforcing mechanism or 
“entrenchment effect” (Pandey et al., 2005, p. 1). Large and established online 
businesses generally receive relatively many clicks and downloads, giving them a 
higher position in the rankings of search results. These higher rankings lead to 
more clicks and downloads for these firms, improving their rankings further. This 
self-enforcing mechanism could reduce the ability of new and small online busi-
nesses to challenge large and established players—even if they have a superior of-
fer (Pandey et al., 2005, p. 1). 
Based on parallels with the OI Regulation, the proposed non-discrimination princi-
ple aims to protect the ability of small and new players to challenge large incum-
bents within app stores (section 3). Drawing parallels with the assessment of zero-
rating under the OI Regulation, the EU legislator could introduce an effects-based 
prohibition of popularity ranking variables. Based on multiple factors, the effects 
of using popularity ranking variables on consumer choice and the level playing 
field could be assessed. These factors could include the number of small players 
being ranked in top positions within a certain category of applications (e.g. music 
streaming) and the availability of alternative channels to small and new business-
es to reach consumers. To provide legal certainty, the EU legislator could formulate 
factors that give rise to the legal presumption that the non-discrimination princi-
ple is not violated. Such factors could include that app store operators provide a 
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functionality to consumers to switch popularity variables on and off. 
Circumvention of the forbidden ranking rationales 
App store operators may attempt to circumvent the forbidden ranking rationales. 
One way could be that the app store operator tweaks the weights attached to the 
ranking variables in such a way that this results in a higher ranking of its own 
apps. Another way to circumvent the proposed non-discrimination principle could 
be that the app store operator uses a permitted ranking rationale, which neverthe-
less leads to a systematic advantage for its own apps when it is combined with 
other terms and conditions applicable to the app store. For example, Apple impos-
es an obligation on app developers that offer digital goods and services in the App 
Store to use its payment systems. This obligation is combined with a 30% commis-
sion in the first year (ACM, 2019, p. 96). This commission drives up the prices of 
these applications for consumers, while this is not the case for Apple's own appli-
cations. As a result, the use of the permitted ranking rationale of price could still 
favour Apple's own apps over those of competitors in the rankings of search re-
sults. 
The OI Regulation prohibits any agreements and practices of ISPs that circumvent 
the goals and provisions of the Regulation (see for example BEREC, 2020, para 
126). Similarly, the proposed framework would forbid app store operators to en-
gage in ranking practices that circumvent the forbidden ranking rationales. The 
proposal for the DMA also seeks to ensure that the proposed prohibition of self-
favouring rankings is not circumvented (Proposal DMA, Article 11). To that end, the 
current text of the DMA prohibits “any measure that may have an equivalent effect 
to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking” (Proposal DMA, consider-
ation 49). 
Section 5: Rebutting counter-arguments 
Rankings have a limited impact on consumer choice 
An argument against the proposed framework can be that discriminatory ranking 
practices of online platforms have little impact on consumer choice and the eco-
nomic performance of online businesses. The argument goes that consumers with 
strong preferences will find the application they are looking for, even when their 
preferred application has a low ranking in the search results (Manne & Wright, 
2012, p. 176). Consumers with weak preferences are to a larger degree influenced 
by the rankings, but their lack of preferences suggests little welfare loss (Manne & 
Wright, 2012, p. 177). 
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However, a study from Narayanan and Kalyanam (2015) suggests that consumers 
with weak preferences and lesser-known businesses are more strongly affected by 
online rankings. Consumers generally have less strong preferences for applications 
that are relatively unknown, while incumbents have had the time to form con-
sumer preferences. New businesses generally belong to the category of lesser-
known companies, which are thus more strongly affected by the position in the 
rankings. 
Consumers with weak preferences arguably require additional protection, because 
they are more vulnerable to the influence that app store operators exert through 
their rankings of search results. The proposed non-discrimination principle aims to 
ensure that discriminatory rankings do not limit the ability of new app developers 
with superior offerings to challenge incumbents. 
Regulation hampers innovation of search algorithms 
Another concern with the proposed non-discrimination principle might be that 
regulation intervening with the ranking variables of platforms could reduce inno-
vation of search algorithms (Crane, 2014, p. 401, p. 405). This decreases the ability 
of platforms to differentiate from each other, resulting in a loss of competition be-
tween platforms. 
The proposed framework seeks to protect the innovation and competition in 
downstream markets, such as the market for music streaming services. More 
specifically, the framework aims to protect the ability of small and new app devel-
opers to compete with large and established players. This admittedly imposes lim-
itations on the direction of upstream innovation and competition by app store op-
erators. For example, introducing new self-favouring ranking variables without ob-
jective justification is not allowed (section 4). These limitations are, however, nec-
essary for the protection of downstream innovation and competition. 
Some scholars, such as Renda (2015) have argued that the rules in the OI Regula-
tion could impede the development of innovative network technologies such as 
5G. However, BEREC (2018) considers that the OI Regulation “leaves considerable 
room for the implementation of 5G technologies”. The reason is that the non-dis-
crimination principle in the OI Regulation leaves room for technically differential 
treatment of traffic based on objective technical requirements of traffic (section 3). 
A similar argument can be made against the claim that regulation would stifle in-
novation of search algorithms. The proposed non-discrimination principle leaves 
room to develop innovative ranking variables for which there is potential con-
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sumer demand, while protecting consumer choice and the level playing field. For 
example, app store operators could explore the implementation of new ranking 
variables representing quality, including privacy protection. 
Competition between platforms gives incentive to serve 
consumers 
Some scholars argue that competition between platforms forces them to provide 
high quality search results (Goldman, 2011, p. 101). The value of a platform de-
pends on the presence of a diversity of applications for which there is consumer 
demand (Farrell & Weiser, 2003, p. 101). Platforms would therefore in principle 
have no incentive to discriminate against competing applications. 
In principle, platforms have an interest in attracting a diversity of applications to 
increase the value of the platform. This might be different when an application be-
comes a sufficient competitive threat to the platform's business. In that case, the in-
centive for the platform to discriminate and avoid competition may dominate 
(Krämer & Schnurr, 2018, p. 524). 
Two factors may lead to consumers showing limited switching behaviour in re-
sponse to a decrease in quality of search results. Firstly, online platforms, such as 
Apple, often operate in highly concentrated markets characterised by high switch-
ing costs and network effects (Stucke & Ezrachi, 2017, pp. 76-77). Secondly, Patter-
son (2013) argues that search results can often be regarded as a so-called “cre-
dence good”. This means that it is often hard for consumers to observe the quality 
of search results even after the search (Patterson, 2013, pp. 11-12). The combina-
tion of these factors may reduce the incentive for apps stores to produce high 
quality search results. 
Discriminatory rankings are difficult to detect for authorities 
The search algorithms of app stores are largely a “black box” (Pasquale, 2010, p. 
170), which are protected by the trade secrets of app store operators. Although the 
P2B Regulation introduces various transparency requirements for app stores (sec-
tion 2), these requirements will most likely leave some deviations from the pro-
posed framework unrevealed. For example, the inclusion of “proxies for profit” in 
the algorithms (Mattioli, 2019, p. 6) and more subtle ways of circumventing the 
forbidden ranking rationales (section 4) would be difficult to detect for public au-
thorities. 
Therefore, the enforcement of the proposed framework would only be effective 
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when it is supplemented by a different transparency regime than currently applies 
under the P2B Regulation. Pasquale (2010) has for example proposed a regime of 
“qualified transparency”, which would allow a government agency to detect dis-
criminatory rankings while protecting the trade secrets of platforms. The regime 
could give a government agency the competence to audit the algorithms of an app 
store that acts as a gatekeeper when a reasonable suspicion of discriminatory 
rankings arises. The observed sudden drop of Spotify (section 1) could for example 
give rise to such a reasonable suspicion. The current text of the proposed DMA 
gives the European Commission the power to get access and explanations about 
algorithms when this is necessary for the implementation and enforcement of the 
provisions of the DMA, including the prohibition of self-favouring rankings (Pro-
posal DMA, Article 19 and Article 21 in conjunction with consideration 69). 
To increase legal certainty, the auditability regime could include a safe harbour for 
app store operators that follow a “due diligence procedure” to test for possible 
sources of discrimination in their algorithms (Zingales, 2019, pp. 414-415). The au-
ditability regime could for example be executed by an independent body, consist-
ing of technical experts, which would assist the authority that enforces the pro-
posed non-discrimination principle (Pasquale, 2010, pp. 168-169). The proposal for 
the DMA provides the European Commission with the power to appoint “indepen-
dent external experts and auditors to assist the Commission to monitor the obliga-
tions and measures and to provide specific expertise or knowledge to the Commis-
sion” (Proposal DMA, Article 24(2)). Future will show whether this will result in the 
creation of an independent body of technical experts that provide assistance to 
the Commission when using its proposed power to access algorithms for the im-
plementation of the DMA. 
Conclusion 
Based on parallels with the Open Internet Access Regulation, this article proposes 
new ex ante regulation for rankings of search results in app stores. The proposed 
framework contains a prohibition for app store operators to differentiate between 
app developers in the rankings without objective justification. The article formu-
lates permitted ranking rationales, such as those based on text relevance, price, 
quality and the legality of content. The use of these ranking rationales merely re-
flects consumer choice and the parameters of effective competition within a mar-
ket economy. The article also formulates a categorical ban of self-favouring rank-
ing rationales without objective justification and an effects-based prohibition of 
popularity ranking rationales. These prohibitions are essential to protect consumer 
choice and the ability of small and new app developers to compete against big 
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players in app stores. The article provides recommendations for the way that the 
EU legislator can shape a prohibition of discriminatory rankings in the DMA, and 
how this prohibition can be applied to app stores by the public authority that will 
implement and enforce the provisions of the DMA. 
This article proposes a regulatory framework that focusses on discrimination in the 
rankings of app stores. Future research could explore if the proposed non-discrimi-
nation principle can also be applied to the ranking practices of other platforms, 
such as Google Search and Amazon. Furthermore, it could be investigated further 
what ranking rationales and variables caused the reported drop of Spotify in the 
rankings. The article raises questions about whether the EU legislator should also 
introduce an auditability regime for search algorithms in app stores. Future re-
search could address how such an auditability regime would be shaped. There are 
ongoing discussions among policymakers and scholars about how EU competition 
law should be adapted to the needs of the digital economy. In its current shape, EU 
competition law does not deal effectively with discriminatory rankings in app 
stores. In line with the proposal for the DMA, the proposed regulatory framework 
in this article aims to complement EU competition law to ensure a more effective 
protection of consumer choice and the digital level playing field within app stores 
in the future. 
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